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The Allocation of Equity Issuance Proceeds 
 
Abstract 
We separate equity issuance proceeds into two parts: option proceeds generated by employee 
stock option exercises and non-option proceeds engendered by all other forms of equity 
issues.  We document that over the period 1998-2013, the aggregate amount of option 
proceeds exceeds that of non-option proceeds for a large sample of U.S. firms.  In particular, 
firms allocate option proceeds predominantly to cash holdings, followed by investment and 
equity repurchase, while non-option proceeds are mainly allocated to investment and cash 
holdings.  Further analysis shows that financial constraints affect the allocation of equity 
issuance proceeds by shifting the use of option proceeds away from stock repurchases to 
investment and cash savings, while directing non-option proceeds away from investment to 
cash savings.   
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I. Introduction 
In recent years, the trend of offering stock options to employees has become increasingly 
widespread among U.S. firms.  According to the National Center for Employee Ownership 
(NCEO), employee stock option holders have grown, as of 2012, from one to nearly nine 
million in number since the late 1980s.
1
  In fact, based on our sample that consists of S&P 
1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms over the period 1998-2013, we find that the value of employee 
stock options granted amounts to almost $1.4 trillion in aggregate.
2
  As such options get 
exercised, firms effectively issue equity internally to their employees and experience a 
substantial amount of cash inflows, being proceeds from employee stock option exercises.  
Indeed, we find that such proceeds sum to a daunting $642 billion.
3
  To put this amount into 
perspective, for the same set of firms over the sample period, the combined amount of all 
other forms of equity issuance, including initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs), and private placements is only approximately $421 billion.   
 Despite such a growing significance of employee stock option proceeds, most of the 
academic research to date has been focused mainly on either equity issued to all equity 
investors, i.e., total equity issues as defined using Compustat cash flow statement, or equity 
issued mostly to outside investors, as defined using Thompson Financial SDC Platinum 
database, in the form of IPOs, SEOs, or private placements.  It is noteworthy that equity 
issued to corporate insiders (i.e., employees) as a result of stock option exercises has been 
largely unexplored.  In this paper, we therefore evaluate the importance of equity issued to 
employees relative to all other forms of equity issuance.  In particular, we examine how firms 
put the resulting option proceeds to various uses and whether they exhibit any difference in 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.nceo.org. 
2
 In an earlier paper, Hall and Murphy (2003) document that the aggregate value of stock options granted by U.S. 
companies increased drastically from $11 billion in 1992 to $119 billion in 2000.  
3
 Using hand-collected data on S&P 100 firms over the period 1999-2001, Fama and French (2005) find that the 
value of equity issued to employees through compensation plans exceeds the value of equity issued through 
SEOs and private placements.   
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allocating option and non-option proceeds to specific uses of funds.  Moreover, we examine 
whether financial constraints impact on the allocation of equity issuance proceeds and 
whether such constraints affect the allocation of option and non-option proceeds differently. 
 To address these research questions, we explicitly collect data on employee stock 
option exercises and separate equity issuance proceeds into two parts: option proceeds 
generated by employee stock option exercises and non-option proceeds engendered by all 
other forms of equity issues.  Specifically, we relate non-option proceeds mostly to equity 
issues initiated by the firms' managers in the form of IPOs and SEOs.  We believe that such a 
separation of equity issuance proceeds is important.  In particular, understanding the different 
motives behind these equity issues helps us to appreciate the need to analyze them as two 
separate classes of equity issues and gives meaning and purpose to our analysis of the 
allocation of the resulting equity issuance proceeds.  Specifically, uses of proceeds arising 
from IPOs or SEOs  are typically pre-determined; these proceeds are usually spent according 
to the firms' prospectus.  On the other hand, proceeds from the exercise of employee stock 
options are often uncertain in terms of amount and timing, and are therefore more ad-hoc and 
discretionary in nature.  As such, understanding how option proceeds are allocated to various 
uses, such as investment, security repurchase, and cash reserve built-up, can not only provide 
important insights into the investment and financing conditions of the firms, but also shed 
more light on the potential agency conflicts that they could face.
4
 
 Our empirical analysis hinges upon the cash flow identity, as defined using the 
Compustat flow-of-funds data, that the sum of all uses of cash flow must be equal to the cash 
                                                          
4
 In fact, in a related paper, McKeon (2013) attempts to distinguish between two broad categories of equity 
issuance.  That is, he regards equity issues resulting from the exercise of employee stock options as being a 
predominant part of "investor-initiated" issues while IPOs, SEOs and private placements are collectively known 
as "firm-initiated" issues. 
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flow itself.
5
  Following Chang et al. (2013), we assume that firms make investment, cash 
holdings, dividend, and financing decisions jointly, subject to the constraint that uses of funds 
must equal sources of funds.
6
  Given that total equity issues is reported as an aggregate figure 
in Compustat and is comprised of all forms of equity issuance that generate cash inflows to a 
firm, we separate option proceeds from other forms of equity issuance proceeds by defining 
the latter as non-option proceeds.  To examine how firms allocate equity issuance proceeds to 
the various uses, we measure their allocation decisions using the coefficients on such cash 
inflows within a regression framework.  That is, we individually regress the various uses of 
funds on all sources of funds (including option and non-option proceeds), controlling for firm 
fundamentals and year effects.  As such, this framework has the methodological advantage of 
offering a complete view of the allocation of equity issuance proceeds by simultaneously 
tracking all uses of such cash inflows, interrelated among one another by virtue of the cash 
flow identity.  The sensitivity of equity issuance proceeds to a particular use of funds 
therefore reveals how much of an additional dollar of proceeds is directed towards that use.  
Moreover, to the extent that investment, stock repurchase, and cash savings, the three most 
fundamental uses of equity issuance proceeds as suggested by the existing literature, are 
competing uses of funds, firms may exhibit a preference for one use over the other two.  In 
gauging the relative importance of these uses, our analysis also reveals whether firms 
systematically prioritize their spending, thereby informing more about their cash spending 
behavior.   
                                                          
5
 Specifically, uses of cash flow include investment, cash savings, working capital needs, debt and/or equity 
repurchases, and dividends while the cash flow itself is comprised of total equity issues, debt issues, and 
operating cash flows.   
6
 Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) argue that when examining how firms allocate cash flows across the 
various uses of funds, one needs to simultaneously estimate the cash flow sensitivities to these uses and impose 
the constraint that these sensitivities sum to unity because failure to do so will result in erroneous coefficient 
estimates.  Chang et al. (2013), however, show that this claim is false in that the single-equation model without 
linear constraints and the simultaneous-equation framework with linear constraints offer identical results as long 
as the cash flow identity holds in the data and the same set of explanatory variables is included in all the uses-of-
funds equations. 
6 
 
 Our results show that equity issued as a result of employee stock option exercises is 
growing in relative importance; the amount of option proceeds grew from being only 0.87 
times as much as that of non-option proceeds in 1998 to being approximately 2.75 times in 
2013, a three-fold increase, to say the least.  In addition, we find that firms allocate option 
and non-option proceeds to different magnitude of uses.  On one hand, firms add on average, 
64 cents to their cash holdings in the same year that they receive a dollar of option proceeds.  
They also increase their investment and equity repurchases by 34 and 31 cents respectively, 
consistent with previous studies such as Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich (2011) and 
Bens et al. (2003).  More importantly, addition to cash holdings constitutes the most 
significant use of option proceeds, more significant than other uses combined.  On the other 
hand, firms only save 42 cents out of an extra dollar of non-option proceeds.  Such proceeds 
are however, more intensively invested (56 cents as opposed to the 34 cents of option 
proceeds allocated to investment).  In a contemporaneous setting, there is therefore a 
difference in the way firms allocate option and non-option proceeds to various uses, with the 
saving rate of option proceeds being higher than that of non-option proceeds. 
 Next, in examining the allocation of equity issuance proceeds in a dynamic setting, 
we find that in the year of option exercise, firms park a majority of their option proceeds as 
cash ($0.74 out of every dollar of option proceeds).  This may result from managers being 
unable to predict the exact timing and amount of option proceeds, which are predominantly 
driven by the degree of in-the-moneyness of the options outstanding and hence, by market 
conditions.  As such, managers may be caught off guard with these unexpected proceeds, 
parking them temporarily on the balance sheet as cash.  We find however that, one year after 
the receipt of such option proceeds, these firms adjust their cash holdings downwards by 
repurchasing equity at a rate of 31 cents per dollar of option proceeds received a year ago.  
More importantly, two years post the option exercise year, there is no difference in the way 
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firms allocate option and non-option proceeds in that the dynamic cash saving rates for both 
types of proceeds are similar.  In other words, despite the different motives behind the two 
types of equity issues as pointed out by McKeon (2013), a similar portion of both kinds are 
saved as cash.  From a dynamic perspective, cash inflows from one source (employees) are 
no different from those arising from another (outside investors).  
 Last, we find that financial constraints affect the allocation of equity issuance 
proceeds.  Using five different measures of financial constraints, we divide our sample into 
two groups, more and less financially constrained firms, and repeat the allocation analysis for 
each subsample.
7
  Consistent with the costly external financing theories, we find that more 
financially constrained firms save a greater portion of their equity issuance proceeds than do 
less financially constrained firms.  More importantly, financial constraints seem to have a 
different impact on the allocation of equity inflows, depending on whether they are option or 
non-option proceeds.  That is, we find that financial constraints tend to shift the allocation of 
option proceeds (non-option proceeds) away from stock repurchase (investment) and towards 
investment (cash savings). 
 In getting our results, it is noteworthy that as opposed to McKeon (2013), who 
imputes the amount of investor- and firm-initiated issuances based on their relative sizes, we 
construct our sample by directly collecting data on employee stock option exercises.  Our 
sample consists of 18,343 firm-year observations (2,112 firms) over the period 1998-2013.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is by far the largest sample of employee stock option 
exercises.  This sample, we argue, provides a more accurate estimate of the number and 
amount of investor-initiated issues than that based on the identification rule of McKeon 
(2013).  That is, McKeon (2013) defines investor-initiated issues as equity issues with 
                                                          
7
 Specifically, our five measures of financial constraints include firm size, the two financial constraint indices of 
Hadlock and Piece (2010) and Whited and Wu (2006), the firm's dividend paying status, as well as the existence 
of a credit rating for the firm. 
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amounts less than 2% of the respective firms' market equity and being predominately made 
up of proceeds from employee stock option exercises.  In other words, they are issues which 
are passively receipted by managers, who make no contemporaneous issuance action on their 
part.  Firm-initiated issues, on the other hand, are actively managed by managers, who make 
conscientious efforts in raising external capital and decide on the amount and timing of these 
issues.  To be more specific, these are equity issues with amounts greater than 3% of market 
equity, the proceeds of which, are what we would define as non-option proceeds.   
 We note that under his rule, a firm can only be classified as having issued in a 
particular year, either investor- or firm-initiated equity, but not both.  For example, should a 
firm receives an annual amount of option proceeds exceeding 3% of the market value of its 
equity, it will be mistakenly deemed as having issued firm-initiated equity.  Moreover, given 
that equity issues with a size between 2 to 3% of market equity are deemed as ambiguous and 
therefore disregarded by McKeon (2013), his rule misses out on firms that receive moderate 
amounts of option and/or non-option proceeds.  In fact, cross checking his rule against our 
more precise data, we find that for all sample years, more than 50% of our sample firms issue 
both types of equity.  Furthermore, to the extent that investor-initiated issues are 
predominately made up of option proceeds, his rule systematically overestimates the amount 
of investor-initiated issues and is less accurate in imputing the quantity and amount of firm-
initiated issues. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature by providing one of the first large-sample 
evidence on the allocation of equity issuance proceeds by U.S. firms.  Unlike McKeon (2013), 
who uses an arbitrary rule to impute the amounts of investor-initiated issues, we explicitly 
collected a majority of them from various sources.  As a result, we offer a relatively more 
accurate estimate of the magnitude of investor-initiated issues.  To add on to his results that 
equity inflows are largely initiated by investors through the exercise of employee stock 
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options, we find that firms allocate to various uses, option and non-option proceeds in a 
different way.  In particular, option proceeds are more greatly saved than are non-option 
proceeds.  As such, although McKeon (2013) refutes the conjecture of McLean (2011) on the 
basis that most issues are investor-initiated and hence cannot be taken as evidence that firms 
issue equity to save cash, we find that firms do save the option proceeds even though the 
issuances per se does not originate from precautionary motives.  This saving rate of option 
proceeds converges however, to that of non-option proceeds over the years following the 
option exercise year.   
 Additionally, in view of the sparse theoretical guidance on how the degree to which 
firms are financially constrained would affect the allocation of equity issuance proceeds, we 
seek to establish empirical evidence so as to inform theory.
8
  In particular, we find that 
regardless of the degree of financial constraint, cash savings remains an important use of both 
option and non-option proceeds, with financially constrained firms saving relatively more out 
of both types of equity inflows.  With these results, our paper attempts to fill a gap in the 
literature by documenting that cash savings is an important use of option proceeds.  To be 
specific, although previous studies have investigated the impact of employee stock option 
exercises on firms' investment and security repurchase decisions, the literature is incomplete 
in that it neglects cash savings as another major outlet for option proceeds.
9
  Such a lack of 
evidence is surprising in view of the increasing reliance of U.S. firms on stock options to 
compensate top managers and rank-and-file employees, and the significant amount of cash 
flows arising from these option exercises. 
                                                          
8
 For example, theory does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether firms facing more severe 
financial constraints should invest more or save more when they have additional cash flow.  For example, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that even in a one-period model, investment-cash flow sensitivities do not 
necessarily increase with the degree of financing constraints. 
9
 See among others, Babenko, Lemmon and Tserlukevich (2011) and Bens et al. (2003).  We review the 
literature in greater details in Section II.  
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 Furthermore, by examining how option and non-option proceeds are allocated to the 
various uses of funds, our paper attempts to update the literature, which to date, only informs 
about how option or non-option proceeds but not both, are allocated to a single use (such as 
investment or equity repurchase), as opposed to multiple uses of funds.  In other words, our 
paper aims to provide a more complete picture about the equity inflow allocation decisions of 
U.S. firms by simultaneously examining their investment policies, stock repurchase activities 
and corporate cash policies, three of the most fundamental uses of equity issuance proceeds 
as suggested by prior research.  To the extent that these three policies entail competing uses 
of equity issuance proceeds, our empirical framework also serves to gauge the relative 
importance of these uses. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief discussion of 
the existing literature.  Section III describes our sample and variables.  Section IV develops 
the empirical models and presents the results.  Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II. Related Literature 
In examining how equity issuance proceeds (i.e., both cash inflows from employee 
stock option exercises and from all other equity issues) are allocated across the various uses 
of funds, we bring together two strands of literature.  First, by documenting how option 
proceeds are allocated across the various uses of funds, our paper contributes to the literature 
on the economic functions of stock options granted to employees on a large scale basis.  
Specifically, Hall and Liebman (1998) find a strong positive relation between firm 
performance and CEO compensation, driven almost entirely by changes in the value of stock 
and stock options held by the CEO.  With this meaningful link between CEO pay and firm 
performance, they therefore posit that stock options help to mitigate agency costs by aligning 
the incentives of executives with those of their firms' owners.  On the other hand, Yermack 
11 
 
(1995) finds that firms in less-regulated industries, firms which are difficult to monitor and 
firms which face financial constraints, are more likely to use stock options as a substitute for 
cash compensation.  In fact, Core and Guay (2001) investigate the compensation schemes 
offered to employees other than the five highest-paid executive officers and find that non-
executive employee stock options serve as a substitute for cash compensation when firms 
face cash flow constraints and when the costs of external capital are high.  Oyer and Schaefer 
(2005) cite three possible explanations for granting stock options to middle managers.  That 
is, stock option grants provide incentives to employees, induce them to sort their beliefs about 
their firms' prospects, as well as help to retain these employees.  The authors argue that 
although these options serve as an inefficient incentive mechanism, they efficiently 
compensate and/or retain employees who are sufficiently optimistic about their firms’ 
prospects.  Chang et al. (2013) find that stock options granted to non-executive employees 
increase risk-taking incentive, enhance failure-bearing capacity, encourage long-term 
commitment, and promote teamwork of employees, leading to greater innovation success. 
Besides serving the above-mentioned economic functions, employee stock options are 
essentially equity issues that generate cash inflows to the issuing firms.  As such, proceeds 
from the exercise of these stock options represent a source of funds to the firms.  Therefore, 
in finding that employee stock option exercises bring about an increase in investment, as well 
as an increase in the intensity of firms' equity repurchase activities, our paper closely relates 
to several studies about the use of proceeds from employee stock option exercises.  For 
example, Kahle (2002) and Bens et al. (2003) examine the impact of stock options on a firm’s 
stock repurchase decisions.  Specifically, Kahle (2002) finds that the likelihood of a stock 
repurchase is high when the amount of total options (i.e., both executive and non-executive) 
exercisable, as a percentage of outstanding shares, is high.  Moreover, once the repurchase 
decision is made, the amount of stock repurchased depends on the amount of total options 
12 
 
exercisable and not on the amount of executive options and unexercisable options.  On the 
other hand, Bens et al. (2003) find that managers are likely to increase their stock repurchases 
when they worry about the dilution effect of outstanding employee stock options.   
In analyzing how stock options affect the investments of firms, Bens, Nagar, and 
Wong (2002) find that firms, concerned about the dilution effect of outstanding employee 
stock options, cut back on their investments to repurchase stocks when they are experiencing 
a large number of option exercises.  On the other hand, Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich 
(2011) show that firms invest, on average, $0.34 out of every dollar of option proceeds.
 10
  In 
addition, they find that only firms that are not financially constrained use option proceeds to 
repurchase stocks; financially constrained firms use these cash flows for their investments.  
Second, by documenting that cash inflows arising from both employee stock option 
exercises and other forms of equity issues constitute the most important contributor to 
corporate cash holdings, our paper elaborates on the strand of literature that focuses only on 
the allocation of, either option proceeds or other equity inflows, to a particular use of funds, 
as opposed to various uses combined.  Specifically, besides focusing on investment and stock 
repurchase as distinct uses of option proceeds, the literature also seems to suggest that cash 
savings is one of the three fundamental uses of cash inflows arising from employee option 
exercises.  This is not surprising given that Keynes (1936) long argues that firms hold cash to 
protect themselves against adverse cash flow shocks that may force them to default on 
payments or forgo valuable investment opportunities.  In fact, a number of empirical studies 
(e.g., Opler et al. (1999), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)) find evidence supporting this 
precautionary motive of cash holdings.   
Most notably, McLean (2011) finds that firms are more likely to issue stocks for cash 
saving purposes when they have greater precautionary motives.  In particular, he examines 
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 Kim and Weisbach (2008) and Hertzel and Li (2010) find that when firms issue equity in general, they often 
use the resulting proceeds for investment.  Moreover, these firms save a large portion of their equity issuance 
proceeds as cash. 
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how firms save out of the proceeds received from total equity issuances, including both 
option and non-option proceeds.  He finds that, on average, firms save only $0.23 per dollar 
of equity issuance proceeds in 1970 and $0.60 per dollar in recent years, suggesting that the 
increase in equity issuance-cash saving sensitivity is due to greater precautionary motives 
rather than to market timing.  In a recent study, McKeon (2013) differentiates firm-initiated 
equity issuances (IPOs, SEOs and private placements) from investor-initiated issuances 
(mainly employee stock option exercises) based on relative issue size, and argue however that 
the high cash saving rate of equity issuance proceeds documented by McLean (2011) is, to a 
large extent, driven by investor-initiated issuances.  Given that investor-initiated issuances 
does not, by definition, involve any conscientious capital raising effort on the part of the 
firms' managers, McKeon (2013) argues against the conjecture brought forth by McLean 
(2011), that firms increasingly issue equity with the purpose of saving cash for precautionary 
motives. 
The distinction, made by McKeon (2013), between firm- and investor-initiated equity 
issuances is certainly interesting.  After all, the existing body of research on firm financing 
has been focused extensively on either equity issued to all equity investors (as defined using 
Compustat cash flow statement) or equity issued mostly to outside investors (as defined using 
Thompson Financial SDC Platinum database).  Equity issued to corporate insiders (i.e., 
employees) as a result of stock option exercises however, has been largely unexplored.  As 
such, by examining the cross-sectional variation in the allocation of both option and non-
option proceeds, we not only shed more light on the dynamics of employee-related equity 
issues, but also inform about the differences exhibited by U.S. firms in allocating the two 
types of proceeds to not just one, but various uses.  In doing so, we hope to provide a more 
complete picture of the equity inflow allocation decisions of U.S. firms, which are typically 
faced with more than one uses and sources of funds.  To the extent that such uses are 
14 
 
competing among themselves for the firms' funds, our simultaneous-equation framework 
enables us to empirically gauge the relative importance of these uses. 
Unlike McKeon (2013), who uses an arbitrary rule based on relative issue size, to 
impute the amounts of investor-initiated issues, we explicitly collected a majority of them 
from various sources.
11
  As a result, we offer a more accurate contrast of the magnitude of 
firm- versus investor-initiated issues.  In addition, it is noteworthy that while he examines the 
relation between market conditions and equity issuance, we focus on the allocation of equity 
issuance proceeds (i.e., both firm- and investor-initiated issues) to various uses. 
   
III. Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
A. Data 
 We obtain data on broad-based employee stock option programs from three sources.  
The first source, the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) Dilution Database, 
which covers S&P 1500 firms (i.e., S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 
firms) during the period 1998-2010, contains data on the firms' stock option programs based 
on the 10-K statements they file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The 
data includes the weighted average exercise price and the number of stock options granted, 
cancelled, and exercised each year.  However, after IRRC was acquired by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) in 2005, the number of options exercised become unavailable in 
the IRRC Dilution Database.  Therefore, for the period 2005-2013, we rely on Compustat, 
which reports from 2004 onwards, the weighted average exercise price and the number of 
stock options granted, cancelled, and exercised each year.  For firms with missing number of 
options exercised, we supplement the data with information from Capital IQ, which offers the 
number of options exercised for the period 1994-2011.  Since Capital IQ does not provide the 
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 Specifically, using quarterly Compustat data and defining the equity issue size as the quarterly proceeds 
divided by market value of equity, McKeon (2013) defines investor-initiated (firm-initiated) equity issuances as 
those with issue size lower (higher) than 2% (3%). 
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exercise price of these options, we rely on the IRRC Dilution Database and Compustat as the 
primary sources of data and Capital IQ as the supplementary data source.  
 As the S&P 1500 index does not include a lot of technology firms which extensively 
grant stock options to employees, we follow Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich (2011) 
and hand-collect, for NASDAQ 100 firms that are not a part of the S&P 1500 index, data on 
employee stock options from the firms' 10-K statements filed with the SEC.  We then merge 
the data on employee stock options with Compustat fundamental annual files to obtain firm 
financial information.  Data on stock prices and returns are retrieved from the Center for 
Research on Security Prices (CRSP) files.  Following common practice in the literature (e.g., 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009 and McLean 2011), we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) 
and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999).  Also excluded are firms with missing data for option 
proceeds and other variables of interest as defined in Section II.B.  Our final sample consists 
of 2,112 firms (18,343 firm-year observations) in the S&P 1500 and NASDAQ 100 indices 
over the period 1998-2013.  The average coverage per firm is 8.7 years due to changes in 
index composition. 
 
B. Variables and the Cash Flow Identity 
 Our empirical analysis hinges upon the following cash flow identity, as defined using 
the flow-of-funds (cash flow statement) data of Compustat: 
 
                     + ,Inv Cash ERep DRep WC Div EIsu DIsu CF Other                      (1) 
where the left-hand side of equation (1) comprises the uses of funds, namely tangible 
investment (Inv), cash savings as measured by the change in cash holdings (ΔCash), equity 
repurchase (ERep), debt repurchase (DRep), working capital needs as measured by the 
change in working capital (ΔWC), and cash dividends (Div).  The right-hand side of equation 
(1) captures the major sources of funds, namely total equity issues (EIsu), debt issues (DIsu) 
16 
 
and operating cash flows (CF).
12
  Other is the residual term that accounts for any rounding 
errors and misreported data that might cause the cash-flow identity to be unbalanced.  
According to Compustat’s data manuals, the definitions of variables in equation (1) vary 
depending on which format code a firm follows in reporting the flow-of-funds data.
13
  
Appendix A details the construction of variables in equation (1) based on the different format 
codes of the flow-of-funds data. 
 As an aggregate figure reported in the statement of cash flows, EIsu includes all forms 
of equity issuance that give rise to cash inflows to a firm.
14
  Among others, it include public 
equity offerings, private placements to outside investors, proceeds from employee stock 
purchase plans, and proceeds from stock option exercises (OP).  Specifically, we define OP, 
one of the key variables of our interest, as the number of options exercised times the 
weighted average exercise price of stock options exercised in a given fiscal year.
15
  To 
separate option proceeds from non-option proceeds, we define the latter equity issuance 
proceeds as EIsu-OP.  In addition, following previous studies on cash flow sensitivities, we 
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 To simplify the analysis, we do not distinguish short-term debt issuances from long-term debt issuances.  
Specifically, DIsu is defined as the sum of long-term debt issues + the change in short-term debt. 
13
 Effective for fiscal years ending July 15, 1988, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) #95 
requires U.S. companies to report the Statement of Cash Flows (format code = 7).  Prior to the adoption of 
SFAS #95, companies may have reported one of the following statements: Working Capital Statement (format 
code = 1), Cash Statement by Source and Use of Funds (format code = 2), and Cash Statement by Activity 
(format code = 3). 
14
 More specifically, EIsu corresponds to Compustat Data Item Number 108 namely, Sale of Common and 
Preferred Stock (Statement of Cash Flows).  It represents funds received from the issuance of common and 
preferred stock and includes the following items: (1) conversion of Class A, Class B, or special stock into 
common stock, (2) conversion of preferred stock and/or debt into common stock, (3) equity offerings, (4) 
exercise of stock options and/or warrants, (5) increase in capital surplus due to stock issuance, (6) issuance of 
warrants when combined with common stock, (7) related tax benefits due to issuance of common and/or 
preferred stock, (8) sale of common stock, (9) sale of preferred stock, (10) sale of redeemable preferred stock 
and (11) sale of stock.  However, this data item excludes issuance of warrants, share issuance costs when 
reported separately and stock of subsidiary company. 
15
 Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich (2011) point out that to the extent that employees are allowed to settle 
the exercise price using their common shares of the company, rather than cash, OP may overestimate the actual 
amount of cash that firms can receive from option exercises.  However, by comparing the IRRC data with their 
hand-collected data on option proceeds from the Statement of Cash Flows, they find that alternative settlement 
methods of option exercises are uncommon in practice, and OP defined using the IRRC data is quite precise. 
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define cash flow as operating cash flows net of the change in working capital (CF-ΔWC ).16  
The augmented cash flow identity can therefore be written as follows. 
 
( ) ( )Inv Cash ERep DRep Div OP EIsu OP DIsu CF WC Other            (2) 
 
 All variables in the cash flow identity are scaled by one-year lagged book value of 
assets.  To control for firm-specific characteristics, we include in our regression analysis, a 
number of firm characteristics as control variables.  That is, the log of book value of assets, 
Ln(Assets), is included as a proxy for firm size.  The market-to-book ratio (MB) is a proxy for 
both firm value and growth opportunities and is defined as (total assets + market value of 
equity - book value of equity) / total assets.  Sales growth is the growth rate of net sales and 
serves as an alternative proxy for growth opportunities.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
over total assets.  Tangibility is a measure of the tangibility of firm assets and is defined as 
the net PPE-to-asset ratio.  These control variables, as well as the variables in equation (1), 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to mitigate the effect of outliers.  
Dollar amounts are deflated to 2005 constant dollars using the GDP deflator. 
 
C. Empirical Methodology 
 To examine how firms allocate equity issuance proceeds to the various uses of funds, 
we measure the allocation of equity issuance proceeds using the coefficients on such cash 
inflows within a regression framework.  That is, we estimate five empirical models in which 
we individually regress the different uses of funds (i.e., Inv, ΔCash, ERep, DRep, and Div) on 
all sources of funds (including option and non-option equity issuance proceeds), firm-specific 
control variables, as well as year and firm fixed effects.  Specifically, the regression 
equations are written as follow: 
                                                          
16
 See Bushman, Smith, and Zhang (2011), Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011) and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan 
(2010). 
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 1 1 1 1 1 11it it it it it it i t itInv OP EIsu OP X Y f y              , (3) 
 2 2 2 2 2 21it it it it it it i t itCash OP EIsu OP X Y f y               , (4) 
 3 3 3 3 3 31it it it it it it i t itERep OP EIsu OP X Y f y              , (5) 
 4 4 4 4 4 41it it it it it it i t itDRep OP EIsu OP X Y f y              , (6) 
 5 5 5 5 5 51 .it it it it it it i t itDiv OP EIsu OP X Y f y               (7) 
 
 In equations (3) to (7), X includes CF- ΔWC, DIsu, and Other.  Y represents the vector 
of firm-specific control variables, which include Ln(Assets), MB, Sales growth, Leverage, and 
Tangibility.  We also include firm fixed effects ( )f  to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity as well as year dummies (y) to account for time effects.  The sensitivity of 
equity issuance proceeds to a particular use of funds thus reveals how much of an additional 
dollar of equity issuance proceeds is directed towards that use.  Accordingly, the allocation of 
option and non-option proceeds across the various uses of funds is captured by βi and φi, 
respectively. 
 Within this integrated regression framework, our approach has a methodological 
advantage in that it offers a complete view of the allocation of equity issuance proceeds by 
simultaneously tracking all uses of such cash inflows, all of which are interrelated by the 
identity that the sum of all uses of cash flow must be equal to the cash flow itself.  Notably, 
Chang et al. (2013) show that if the cash flow identity (equation (1)) holds in the data, the 
coefficients on each source of funds should add up to unity across equations (3) - (7) and the 
coefficients on each control variable in Y should sum to zero across the five equations.  That 
is, 
5
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   In other words, if any source of funds, such as 
internal cash flows or option proceeds, increases by one dollar while holding other sources of 
funds unchanged, then the change in all uses of cash flow must sum to one dollar.  However, 
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if the shock stems from an exogenous or predetermined variable that represents neither a 
source nor a use of funds in the current period, the total response across different uses of cash 
must sum to zero.
17
  In addition, Chang et al. (2013) demonstrate that estimating equations (3) 
- (7) in isolation is equivalent to estimating them as simultaneous equations, so long as the 
five specifications incorporate the same set of right-hand-side variables.
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D. Summary Statistics 
 Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the proceeds from option exercises over time.  It 
presents the aggregate dollar value of total equity issues (EIsu), option proceeds (OP), and 
non-option proceeds (EIsu - OP) across all firms in our sample.  In particular, the aggregate 
amount of OP is substantial, ranging from $14.6 billion in 1998 to $57.0 billion in 2013.  
Both EIsu and OP peak in 2007, the year before the 2008 financial crisis.  Panel B plots OP 
as a percentage of EIsu.  In aggregate, option proceeds account for a large fraction of total 
equity issues throughout the sample period, ranging from 46.4% in 1998 to 73.3% in 2013.  
Like the aggregate amount, option proceeds as a fraction of total equity issues peaks in 2006, 
dropping substantially over the 2008 financial crisis period and then rising sharply again.  
Panel C plots the ratio of option proceeds over non-option proceeds.  Specifically, option 
proceeds were 0.87 times as large as non-option proceeds in 1998 and has been increasing 
drastically before dropping sharply around the 2008 financial crisis period and rising 
substantially again to 2.75 in 2013.  This suggests that employee stock option exercises result 
in more cash flowing into firms than do other forms of equity financing as a whole. 
                                                          
17
 For instance, suppose the coefficient on MB is 0.1 in equation (3), suggesting that investment increases by 10% 
of total assets if MB increases by one.  Since investment is a use of funds and total uses of funds must be equal 
to the total sources of funds, the net effect of the increase of MB on other use must sum to -10% of total assets, 
holding all source variables constant.   
18
 This result is not surprising on account that the simultaneous equations (3) - (7) qualify as seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SURs).  In fact, Kruskal’s (1960) theorem implies that SUR estimates turn out to be 
equivalent to equation-by-equation OLS estimates if the same set of explanatory variables is included in each 
equation.  This is exactly the case in our equations (3) - (7).  See Greene (2008) (page 257-258) for a detailed 
proof. 
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[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample for the variables defined in 
Section III.B. The mean values of OP and EIsu-OP are 0.010 and 0.012, respectively, 
suggesting that the average size of non-option proceeds is greater than that of option proceeds.  
However, the median values of OP and EIsu-OP (0.004 and 0, respectively) indicate that 
firms receive cash from option exercises more often than from other equity issues.  Given that 
the median value of EIsu-OP is zero and the 75
th
 percentile is only 0.003, we infer that the 
high mean value of EIsu-OP is driven by other equity issues that are infrequent and lumpy.  
The mean (median) value of the residual term, Other, is -0.005 (0), suggesting that the cash 
flow identity holds well in our data.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
IV. Results 
A. Contemporaneous allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 To examine the allocation of equity issuance proceeds by U.S. firms, we estimate 
equations (3) - (7) as standalone regressions and report the results in Table 2.  The t-statistics 
are computed using standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and 
heteroskedasticity.  Column (1) presents the results for investment.  The coefficient on OP is 
positive and statistically significant.  Economically, this implies that on average, firms spend 
34 cents on investment in response to every dollar of cash inflow arising from employee 
stock option exercises.  This result is consistent with that of Babenko, Lemmon, and 
Tserlukevich (2011).  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 More importantly, column (2) shows that cash savings is the most important use of 
option proceeds.  Specifically, for each dollar of cash inflow arising from employee stock 
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option exercises, firms in our sample add an average of 64 cents to their cash holdings.  This 
rate of cash saving is statistically significant and economically higher than the spending rate 
of option proceeds on investment.  In contrast, we find that the reverse is true for non-option 
proceeds; firms spend a greater amount of such inflows on investments than they save as cash.  
Having said this, the saving rate of non-option proceeds is still high at an average of 42 cents 
per dollar of non-option proceeds.   
 To summarize, although firms allocate option and non-option proceeds differently, 
cash savings is still the most important use of both types of proceeds.  Notably, given that as 
much as 64 cents out of each dollar of option proceeds are saved as cash, proceeds from 
employee stock option exercises constitute the largest portion of cash inflows saved by the 
firms.  This is in sync with McLean (2011), who posits that firms issue equity for the purpose 
of accumulating cash, saving 60 cents out of every dollar of equity issuance proceeds.  As 
such, by documenting that the increase in share issuance–cash savings in recent years is, to a 
large extent, driven by the high saving rate of option proceeds, our results seem to 
complement that of McLean (2011). 
 In column (3), we document that firms repurchase stock in response to cash inflows 
from employee stock option exercises.  This is consistent with the results of Kahle (2002), 
Bens, Nagar, and Wong (2002) and Bens et al. (2003).  Column (4) suggests that debt 
repurchase is negatively and significantly associated with the option proceeds (coefficient = -
0.32; t-statistic = -5.0), implying that firms reduce debt retirement when employees exercise 
their stock options.  One possible explanation is that inflows from option exercises improve 
corporate liquidity and enhance debt capacity, thereby reducing firms’ incentive to retire debt.  
Another possible explanation is that firms may become underleveraged after employee stock 
options are exercised because employees are more likely to exercise their options when the 
equity value is high.  Firms may therefore be reluctant to repurchase debt so as to avoid 
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further deviating from their target leverage ratios.  Column (5) presents the results for 
dividends.  Specifically, the coefficient on OP is positive and statistically significant 
(coefficient = 0.03; t-statistic = 3.2), suggesting that employee stock option exercises have a 
significant impact on dividend decisions.  Note that the sum of the coefficients on OP across 
the five regressions is equal to one, thereby confirming the validity of these regressions 
which are based on the cash flow identity.  Taken together, these results suggest that addition 
to cash holdings outweighs investment and stock repurchase as the most important outlet for 
equity issuance proceeds.   
 As a side note, out of each dollar of operating cash flow, firms allocate 48 cents to 
investment, save 35 cents as cash, repurchase equity with 6 cents, retire 10 cents of debt, and 
pay dividends with 1 cent.  In addition, we find that firms issue debt mainly to retire existing 
debt; for each dollar of debt issuance proceeds received, 59 cents are used to repurchase debt, 
while 35 cents are allocated to investment and only 4 and 2 cents are parked as cash and used 
for stock repurchase, respectively.  Finally, the coefficients on other control variables reveal 
that the rate of cash savings is lower for large firms than for firms with more tangible assets.  
As discussed above, the sum of the coefficients on every control variable across the five 
regressions is equal to zero. 
 
B. Dynamic allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 If the difference in cash saving rates of option and non-option proceeds is temporary, 
then we expect the increase in cash due to these equity issues to be reversed in subsequent 
years.  Specifically, we add the lagged values (from t-3 to t-1) of OP, EIsu-OP and other 
sources of funds into equation (4).  For ease of interpreting the coefficients, we scale all 
lagged variables by total assets at t-1, the same deflator for all contemporaneous sources-of-
funds variables.  Since we require firms to have at least three years of history for the sources-
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of-funds variables, including option and non-option proceeds, the number of observations for 
this test is reduced from 18,343 to 11,297.  The regression results with lagged sources-of-
funds variables are presented in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on concurrent OP remains 
statistically and economically significant after controlling for lagged values of various 
sources-of-funds.  Moreover, the coefficient (0.74) is greater than that (0.64) in column (2) of 
Table 2.  Further, the coefficient on OPt-1 is negative and statistically significant (coefficient 
= -0.32; t-statistic = -2.9), while the coefficients on OPt-2 and OPt-3 are statistically 
insignificant.  The magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that firms retain, on average, 74 
cents as cash holdings for every dollar of cash inflow arising from employee stock option 
exercises occurring in the same period.  However, in the year following option exercises, 
firms do adjust their cash holdings downwards.  In particular, for every dollar of cash inflow 
arising from employee stock option exercises at t-1, firms reduce their current cash holdings 
by an average of 32 cents, mainly through the repurchase of equity (31 cents).  Given that the 
coefficients on OPt-2 and OPt-3 are statistically insignificant with a magnitude of only 0.01 
and -0.08, respectively, we find no evidence that firms reduce their cash holdings two and 
three years after option exercises.   
 However, by adding up the coefficients on option proceeds from t-3 to t, one can infer 
that an average firm receiving a dollar of cash inflow from option exercises today, will still 
have 35 cents (= 0.74 – 0.32 + 0.01 - 0.08) parked on the balance sheet as cash three years 
later.  Repeating the cash saving analysis for non-option proceeds, we find that three years 
post the issuance of such equity, firms still retain 32 cents (= 0.37 - 0.05 + 0.01 - 0.01) out of 
every dollar of non-option proceeds.  That is, from a dynamic perspective, firms save option 
and non-option proceeds at similar rates.  In fact, these equity issuance proceeds emerge, 
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among all cash inflows, as the most important contributor to corporate cash holdings.  This is 
consistent with McLean (2011), who posits that firms issue equity for the purpose of cash 
savings. 
 As a robustness check, we re-estimate the models in Table 3 using the “event-year” 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach.  In other words, we run Fama-MacBeth regressions by 
event year t, i.e., the number of years a firm is in our sample, rather than by calendar year.  
This will ensure that in measuring lagged option and non-option proceeds, we have sample 
firms with the same length of history for each cross-sectional regression at event year t.  The 
results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 
3 and are omitted to save space.   
 
C. Financial constraints and the allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 In the previous two sections, we use the cash flow identity regressions to illustrate 
how firms allocate their equity issuance proceeds across the various uses of funds.  The next 
item on the research agenda is then to explore the ability of financial constraints in explaining 
the firms' equity inflow allocation decisions.  To do this, we use five different measures of 
financial constraints namely, firm size as proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, 
Ln(Assets), the two financial constraint indices of Hadlock and Piece (2010) and Whited and 
Wu (2006) (HP and WW, respectively), the firm's dividend paying status, as well as the 
existence of a credit rating for the firm.
19
  In particular, a firm is classified as being 
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 The HP index measures a firm’s financial constraints as a function of its age and size.  That is, HP =  -0.737× 
Ln(Assets) + 0.043×(Ln(Assets))
2
 - 0.040×Age.  Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that in many contexts, their 
index is a more reasonable measure of a firm’s financial constraints than other types of constraint measures, 
such as the Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) index of constraints.  The WW index is constructed based on a 
structural model that avoids the measurement errors associated with Tobin’s Q in traditional tests.  Specifically, 
WW = -0.091×Cash Flows/Assets - 0.062×Dividend Payer + 0.021×long-term debt/Assets - 0.044×Ln(Assets) + 
0.102×industry median Sale Growth - 0.035×Sale Growth.  By construction, the higher the scores of the HP or 
WW indices, the more financially constrained the firms are. 
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financially more (less) constrained in a given year if its Ln(Assets) is below (above) the 30th 
percentile, its HP index or WW index is above (below) the 70th percentile, it pays no (pays) 
dividends, or it does not have (has) a credit rating.  Accordingly, we divide our sample into 
two groups, namely less and more financially constrained groups, and re-estimate equations 
(3) - (7) for each subsample.  The results are reported in Table 4.  For the sake of brevity, we 
do not tabulate the coefficients of other explanatory and control variables since they are 
similar to those reported in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 Column (1) and (6) of Panel A present the results for investment.  Most notably, 
regardless of the measure of financial constraints used, we find that for firms that are more 
financially constrained, there is a systematic increase in the intensity of their investments for 
a given dollar increase in the availability of options proceeds.  The investment of less 
financially constrained firms are however, not sensitive to the availability of option proceeds.  
This is consistent with a large body of literature that examines the impact of financial 
constraints on corporate investment by estimating the empirical investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of firms.
20
  In general, the literature suggests that the investment of more 
financially constrained firms should also vary with the availability of internally generated 
cash, rather than just with the availability of positive net present value projects.  Thus, it is 
not surprising that we observe a similar effect between investment and equity inflows that are 
internally generated by employees.  Our results therefore complement the literature by 
documenting another source of funds, cash flows arising from the exercise of employee stock 
options, to which corporate investment is sensitive to.  As a side note, we also find that 
investment is sensitive to the availability of non-option proceeds for both more and less 
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 For a start, see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). Also see Hubbard (1998) for an in-depth survey of the 
literature. 
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financially constrained firms.  See column (1) and (6) of Panel B.  This is not surprising 
given that equity is generally the marginal source of capital for investment.
21
 
 Column (2) and (7) of Panel A and B illustrate the difference in cash saving rates of 
option and non-option proceeds for both subsamples.  We show that, relative to less 
financially constrained firms, firms that are more financially constrained save more out of 
both types of proceeds, consistent with the costly external financing theories, which put forth 
that financially constrained firms build up cash reserves in anticipation of future financing 
difficulty.
22
  It is worthy to note that this result holds consistently across the five different 
measures of financial constraints.  As such, by showing that financially constrained firms also 
build up their cash holdings with option proceeds when such inflows become available, our 
study supplements that of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Khurana, Martin, 
and Pereira (2006), who find that financially constrained firms rely more on internal cash 
flows in building their cash holdings.   
 Column (3) and (8) of Panel A show that less financially constrained firms return 
more option proceeds to stockholders via stock repurchase than do more financially 
constrained firms.  This is consistent with Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich (2011), who 
find that only firms that are not financially constrained use option proceeds to repurchase 
stocks; financially constrained firms use these cash flows for their investments.  We do not 
however, find a statistically significant relation between the intensity of a firm's stock 
repurchase activity and the availability of non-option proceeds across almost all measures of 
financial constraints.  To put the results in a nutshell, financial constraints seem to have a 
different impact on the allocation of equity inflows, depending on whether the proceeds are 
option- or non-option related.  Specifically, we find that financial constraints tend to shift the 
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 See Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009). 
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 Chang et al. (2013) document a similar finding. 
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use of option proceeds away from stock repurchases and towards investment and cash 
savings, while directing non-option proceeds away from investment and towards cash savings.   
 To further explore the dynamic cash saving behavior of our sample firms, we again 
partition our data into two subsamples, depending on whether the firms are more or less 
financially constrained.  We then re-estimate the models in Table 3 and report the results in 
Table 5.  For the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate the coefficients of other explanatory and 
control variables since they are similar to those reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Not surprisingly, we find that relative to their less financially constrained counterparts, 
firms that are more financially constrained save a greater portion of their option proceeds in 
the year of option exercises.  Across all five measures of financial constraints, the coefficients 
on concurrent OP for more financially constrained firms remain statistically and 
economically significant after controlling for the lagged values of various sources-of-funds.  
On the other hand, although the coefficients on concurrent OP for less financially constrained 
firms have the same sign as those for more financially constrained firms, the coefficients are 
not as statistically significant as those for the financially less constrained firms.   
 More interestingly, although we find strong evidence that more financially 
constrained firms adjust their cash holdings downwards one year following the receipt of 
their option proceeds, there is weaker statistical evidence that this is the case for less 
financially constrained firms.  In particular, contrary to those for more financially constrained 
firms, none of the coefficients on OPt-1 are statistically significant.  Moreover, the 
coefficients on OPt-1 do not have the expected negative sign for less financially constrained 
firms defined on the basis of the WW index and the dividend paying status.  As such, we 
deduce that the downward adjustment of cash holdings documented in Table 5, is to a large 
extent, driven by firms that are financially more constrained.  Last but not least, we find little 
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evidence that firms (i.e., both more and less financially constrained firms) reduce their cash 
holdings two or three years after employee stock option exercises; the coefficients on OPt-2 
and OPt-3 are mostly statistically insignificant for both subsamples.  Repeating the cash 
saving analysis for non-option proceeds, we find a similar, albeit weaker, pattern as that for 
option proceeds.   
 To summarize, we find that although firms differ in the way they allocate option and 
non-option proceeds to various contemporaneous uses, they seem to exhibit dynamically 
similar cash saving rates for the two types of proceeds.  More specifically, we find that a 
large part of these proceeds are retained as cash on the balance sheet.  This finding lends 
support to McLean (2011), who puts forth that firms issue equity and save the proceeds out of 
precautionary motives.  Notably, although McKeon (2013) discredits the conjecture of 
McLean (2011) on account that a majority of the equity issues under the latter's study is made 
up of investor-initiated issues which are passively receipted by the firms and hence cannot be 
taken as evidence that these firms issue equity with precautionary motives, we find that this is 
unlikely the case.  Particularly, when the proceeds of these equity issues are more accurately 
defined as option and non-option proceeds in our sample, we find that firms still save as cash, 
a significant portion of their non-option proceeds, issues for which McKeon (2013) defines as 
involving conscientious capital raising effort on the part of the firms' managers.  Having said 
this, even if such issuances per se do not originate from precautionary motives, we find that 
firms do accumulate precautionary cash balances by actively saving the resulting option 
proceeds. 
  
V. Analysis of equity issues 
To recap, McKeon (2013) defines investor-initiated issues as being predominately 
made up of employee stock option proceeds, whereas firm-initiated issues are regarded as all 
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other forms of equity issues, the proceeds of which, are what we would consider as non-
option proceeds.  In this section, we examine how accurate the identification rule of McKeon 
(2013) is in estimating the magnitude of option and non-option proceeds in our sample.  
Specifically, he distinguishes between investor- and firm-initiated issues using an "ISSUE%" 
rule, where ISSUE% is a variable defined as the ratio of common equity proceeds to end of 
period market equity.
23
  According to his rule, equity issues with ISSUE% less than 2% are 
regarded as investor-initiated issues.  To the extent that such issues are largely driven by 
employee stock option exercises, the option proceeds received by our sample firms should be 
less than 2% of the firms' market equity if his rule is accurate.  Similarly, equity issues with 
ISSUE% greater than 3% are deemed as firm-initiated issues by McKeon (2013).  Should his 
rule be accurate, the non-option proceeds received by firms in our sample should be no less 
than 3% of the values of their market equity. 
Panel A of Table 6 explores the accuracy of the ISSUE% rule in imputing the quantity 
and amount of investor- and firm-initiated issues in our sample.  Specifically, according to 
our actual sample data, there is a total 16,153 equity issues worth $642 billion, originating 
from employee stock option exercises throughout the sample period 1998-2013.  Indeed, we 
find that a majority of these issues (15,265 of them with a value of $548 billion) have a 
relative issue size of less than 2%.  Exploring other arbitrary values of ISSUE% beside the 2-
3% as suggested by McKeon (2013), we find that increasing the cut-off percentage for 
investor-initiated issues does not improve the accuracy of the ISSUE% rule.  As such, we 
deduce that the ISSUE% rule of McKeon (2013) is quite accurate in imputing the amount of 
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 That is, using the Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly file, McKeon (2013) computes the quarterly equity 
issuance proceeds of a firm by subtracting the previous quarter value of the proceeds from the sale of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat: SSTKY) from its current year-to-date value.  To isolate common equity 
proceeds, he subtracts preferred equity proceeds from the total equity proceeds; preferred equity proceeds are 
calculated as increases in PSTKQ (or PSTKRQ where missing).  As a side note, observations with negative 
values of quarterly proceeds, as well as those with missing SSTKY, are set to zero.  He then computes the ratio 
of common equity proceeds to end of period market equity for each firm-quarter observation and refers to this 
variable as ISSUE%. 
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investor-initiated issues in our sample.  However, we note that his rule, unlike our actual 
sample data, cannot be used in a regression framework to analyze the allocation of equity 
issuance proceeds.  Moreover, we find that there are 338 investor-initiated issues worth $26 
billion having an ISSUE% greater than 3% and would have been mistakenly classified by 
McKeon (2013) as firm-initiated.  Also, 550 of the issues with a value of $68 billion would 
have been deemed as ambiguous and removed from his sample.  Examining the actual non-
option proceeds in our sample, we find that conditional on the issues being indeed firm-
initiated, the ISSUE% rule systematically misclassify them as being investor-initiated; 9,967 
issues worth $137 billion, out of a total of 11,035 non-option related issues worth $421 
billion, have an ISSUE% less than 2%.  Only 944 issues with a value of $273 billion are 
accurately classified as firm-initiated issues during the sample period, while 124 issues worth 
$11 billion would have been marked as ambiguous and disregarded by McKeon (2013). 
 In addition, we note that under his rule, a firm can only be classified as having issued 
in a particular year, either investor- or firm-initiated equity, but not both.  For example, 
should a firm receives an annual amount of option proceeds exceeding 3% of the market 
value of its equity, it will be mistakenly deemed as having issued firm-initiated equity.  
Moreover, given that equity issues with a size between 2 to 3% of market equity are deemed 
as ambiguous and therefore disregarded by McKeon (2013), his rule misses out on firms that 
receive moderate amounts of option and/or non-option proceeds.  In fact, cross checking his 
rule against our more precise data, we find that for all sample years, more than 50% of our 
sample firms issue both types of equity.  For example, Panel B of Table 6 shows that our 
sample firms issue a total of 692 equity issues in the year 1998, 465 of which are from firms 
which issue equity to both employees and outside investors.  In contrast, the ISSUE% rule 
predicts that 607 firms issue only investor-initiated issues, thereby overestimating the actual 
number of such issues in our sample. 
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On account that we directly collect data on employee stock option exercises from 
various sources, we argue that our sample provides a more accurate estimate of the number 
and amount of investor-initiated issues than that based on the identification rule of McKeon 
(2013).  Having this said, we recognize that our definition of non-option proceeds as being 
akin to the firm-initiated issues of McKeon (2013) is also subject to a classification loophole.  
That is, in defining these issues as the difference between total equity issues and the proceeds 
from stock option exercises, we could be potentially classifying other employee-related 
equity issues (such as stock incentive and profit sharing plans) as being firm-initiated.  
However, we believe that such a loophole, if any, will only lead to an underestimation of the 
total amount of employee-related equity issues and bias our results against documenting the 
importance of these issues.  Moreover, stock issued to employees under such plans are solely 
at the discretion of managers and may therefore be more appropriately classified as non-
option proceeds, or what McKeon (2013) describes as, firm-initiated issues.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we first examine how U.S. firms allocate their equity issuance proceeds 
to several contemporaneous uses.  In particular, we examine whether these firms differ in 
their allocations of proceeds from employee stock option exercises versus proceeds from all 
other forms of equity issues.  Using a large sample of data on employee stock option 
exercises for S&1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms during the period 1998-2013, we separately 
regress the various uses of funds on all sources of funds, and find that for each dollar received 
from employee stock option exercises, an average firm saves $0.64 as cash, invests $0.34, 
and spends $0.31 on stock repurchase, reduces debt retirement by $0.32 and pays dividends 
of $0.03.  On the other hand, for each dollar of non-option proceeds received, the firm saves 
$0.42 as cash, invests $0.56, reduces spending on stock repurchase by $0.01 and increases 
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debt retirement by $0.04.  However, despite the differing contemporaneous allocation of 
option and non-option proceeds, we find that cash savings constitutes the most important use 
of both types of proceeds.   
 Next, we shift our analysis to a dynamic setting and find that despite their disparate 
contemporaneous allocations, the two types of proceeds have dynamically comparable cash 
savings rates.  That is, cash from one source (employees) is saved no differently from cash 
from another (outside investors).  Last, we examine whether financial constraints impact on 
the allocation of equity issuance proceeds and if yes, whether such constraints affect the 
allocation differently, depending on whether the proceeds are option- or non-option related.  
Most notably, we find that regardless of the degree of financial constraint, cash savings 
remains an important motive for equity issuance proceeds.  Nevertheless, relative to their less 
financially constrained counterparts, more financially constrained firms save more out of both 
option and non-option proceeds.  In sum, financial constraints affect the allocation of equity 
issuance proceeds by shifting the use of option proceeds away from stock repurchases to 
investment and cash savings while directing the use of non-option proceeds away from 
investment to cash savings.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of employee stock option proceeds 
 
The sample covers firms in the S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 indices for the years 1998 to 2013.  Panel 
A presents the aggregate amount of total equity issues, option proceeds, and non-option proceeds by 
calendar year.  Panel B presents the ratio of aggregate option proceeds over aggregate total equity 
issues by calendar year. Panel C presents the ratio of aggregate option proceeds over aggregate non-
option proceeds by calendar year.  Non-option proceeds is computed as the difference between total 
equity issues and option proceeds. 
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Panel B: Option proceeds over total equity issues 
 
 
Panel C: Option proceeds over non-option proceeds  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The sample covers firms in the S&P 1500 and the Nasdaq 100 indices for the years 1998 to 2013.  
The variables follow the cash flow identity equation and are all scaled by book assets.   
( ) ( )Inv Cash ERep DRep Div OP EIsu OP DIsu CF WC Other            
OP is option proceed. EIsu-OP is non-option proceeds. CF is operating cash flows.  DIsu is debt 
issues. Other is other cash flows.  Inv is investments.  ∆Cash is change in cash.  ERep is stock 
repurchase. DRep is debt repurchase.  ∆WC is change in working capital.  Div is dividends.  The 
detailed definitions for variables in the cash flow identity are in Appendix A.  MB is the ratio of 
market assets over book assets.  Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales.  Ln(Assets) is the log 
of book assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book assets.  Tangibility is the ratio of fixed-
assets over book assets. 
  Mean S.D. 25
th
 Median 75
th
 
  Sources of cash 
Option proceeds (OP) 0.010 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.013 
Total equity issues (EIsu) 0.022 0.055 0.002 0.006 0.018 
Other equity issues (EIsu-OP) 0.012 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Operating cash flows (CF) 0.129 0.095 0.075 0.120 0.175 
Debt issues (DIsu) 0.118 0.242 0.000 0.018 0.134 
Other cash flows (Other) -0.005 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.003 
  Uses of cash 
Tangible investments (Inv) 0.100 0.146 0.025 0.064 0.137 
Change in cash (ΔCash) 0.016 0.087 -0.016 0.004 0.039 
Equity repurchase (ERep) 0.032 0.058 0.000 0.003 0.040 
Debt repurchase (DRep) 0.092 0.178 0.000 0.020 0.096 
Change in working capital (ΔWC) 0.012 0.056 -0.013 0.008 0.034 
Dividends (Div) 0.011 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.015 
  Firm characteristics 
Cash 0.167 0.176 0.032 0.102 0.245 
MB 2.045 1.691 1.219 1.598 2.307 
Sales growth 0.118 0.379 -0.008 0.079 0.186 
Ln(Assets) 7.284 1.623 6.146 7.168 8.322 
Leverage 0.209 0.184 0.027 0.192 0.326 
Tangibility 0.262 0.217 0.094 0.195 0.371 
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Table 2. Contemporaneous allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 
Employee stock option data are collected from the IRRC dilution database, Compustat, and Capital IQ. 
Cash holdings data are obtained from Compustat. The sample covers S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms 
for the years 1998 to 2013. OP is option proceeds. EIsu-OP is non-option proceeds. CF is operating 
cash flows. Disu is debt issues. Other is other cash flows. Inv is investments. ∆Cash is change in cash. 
ERep is stock repurchase. DRep is debt repurchase. ∆WC is change in working capital. Div is 
dividends. The variables follow the cash flow identity equation and are all scaled by book assets. 
( ) ( )Inv Cash ERep DRep Div OP EIsu OP DIsu CF WC Other            
MB is the ratio of market assets over book assets. Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales. 
Ln(Assets) is the log of book assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book assets. Tangibility is 
the ratio of fixed-assets over book assets. The regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS), 
with firm and year fixed-effects in all the regressions and t-statistics computed using standard errors 
robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div 
OP  0.34***   0.64***   0.31***   -0.32***   0.03***  
  (3.5)   (7.5)   (6.5)   (-5.0)   (3.2)  
EIsu-OP  0.56***   0.42***   -0.01   0.04   0.00  
  (16.4)   (15.9)   (-1.6)   (1.5)   (1.4)  
CF-ΔWC  0.48***   0.35***   0.06***   0.10***   0.01***  
  (28.9)   (24.7)   (9.3)   (8.7)   (5.3)  
DIsu  0.35***   0.04***   0.02***   0.59***   0.00  
  (39.6)   (8.1)   (6.0)   (69.1)   (0.8)  
Other  0.35***   0.11***   0.01   0.53***   -0.01***  
  (13.3)   (6.4)   (1.1)   (23.2)   (-4.0)  
MB  0.01***   -0.00***   0.00***   -0.01***   0.00***  
  (5.7)   (-3.0)   (3.3)   (-6.5)   (2.8)  
Sales growth  0.01**   0.00   -0.00***   -0.00   -0.00**  
  (2.1)   (0.2)   (-5.1)   (-1.0)   (-2.4)  
Ln(Assets)  -0.01***   -0.01***   0.01***   0.01***   0.00*  
  (-4.5)   (-3.6)   (11.3)   (3.3)   (1.8)  
Leverage  -0.18***   0.00   -0.07***   0.26***   -0.01***  
  (-17.6)   (0.5)   (-17.1)   (27.9)   (-8.3)  
Tangibility  -0.05***   0.11***   -0.02***   -0.04***   -0.00  
  (-2.8)   (8.9)   (-3.5)   (-3.1)   (-1.1)  
Observations 18,343 18,343 18,343 18,343 18,343 
R-squared 0.56 0.29 0.48 0.83 0.68 
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Table 3. Dynamic allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 
Employee stock option data are collected from the IRRC dilution database, Compustat, and Capital IQ. 
Cash holdings data are obtained from Compustat.  The sample covers S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 
firms for the years 1998 to 2013.  ∆Cash is the ratio of change in cash and cash equivalents over book 
assets.  OP is the ratio of option proceeds over book assets.  EIsu-OP is the ratio of non-option 
proceeds over book assets.  CF is the ratio of operating cash flows over book assets.  DIsu is the ratio 
of debt issues over book assets.  Other is the ratio of other cash flows over book assets.  MB is the 
ratio of market assets over book assets.  Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales.  Ln(Assets) is 
the log of book assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book assets.  Tangibility is the ratio of 
fixed-assets over book assets.  The regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS) with firm and 
year fixed-effects in all the regressions and t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div 
OPt 0.31** 0.74*** 0.30*** -0.39*** 0.05*** 
 (2.3) (6.2) (4.4) (-4.2) (3.1) 
OPt-1 0.08 -0.32*** 0.31*** -0.07 0.00 
 (0.6) (-2.9) (4.9) (-1.0) (0.3) 
OPt-2 0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.15** 0.02 
 (0.6) (0.1) (1.2) (-2.1) (1.5) 
OPt-3 0.15 -0.08 -0.00 -0.09 0.02 
 (1.4) (-0.9) (-0.0) (-1.5) (1.4) 
(EIsu-OP)t 0.59*** 0.37*** -0.02* 0.06 0.00 
 (11.4) (9.1) (-1.9) (1.5) (0.4) 
(EIsu-OP)t-1 0.09*** -0.05* -0.02*** -0.02 -0.00* 
 (2.9) (-1.9) (-2.8) (-1.6) (-1.8) 
(EIsu-OP)t-2 0.02 0.01 -0.02*** -0.00 0.00 
 (1.1) (0.4) (-4.1) (-0.4) (0.2) 
(EIsu-OP)t-3 0.03* -0.01 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 
 
(1.9) (-1.0) (-2.7) (-0.6) (-0.1) 
(CF-ΔWC)t 0.47*** 0.37*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.01*** 
 
(18.9) (18.1) (4.1) (6.6) (5.8) 
(CF-ΔWC)t-1 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.04*** -0.02 0.01*** 
 (3.1) (-5.0) (5.2) (-1.6) (3.4) 
(CF-ΔWC)t-2 0.02 -0.03* 0.01 -0.00 0.00* 
 (1.2) (-1.9) (1.2) (-0.1) (1.8) 
(CF-ΔWC)t-3 0.02** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 
 (2.3) (0.3) (-2.3) (-2.5) (0.6) 
DIsut 0.35*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.61*** 0.00 
 (28.6) (4.9) (4.1) (53.3) (1.1) 
DIsut-1 -0.04*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.04*** -0.00*** 
 (-6.1) (0.9) (-3.1) (7.1) (-3.4) 
DIsut-2 -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.00 0.01* -0.00 
 (-3.3) (3.0) (-0.9) (1.9) (-1.4) 
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DIsut-3 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (-1.0) (0.4) (-0.8) (1.2) (-0.8) 
Othert 0.32*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.56*** -0.01*** 
 (7.8) (4.9) (0.5) (17.5) (-3.2) 
Othert-1 0.05 0.07*** -0.00 -0.12*** -0.00 
 (1.4) (2.6) (-0.2) (-3.3) (-0.4) 
Othert-2 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.3) (0.9) (-0.5) (-0.8) (1.3) 
Othert-3 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 
 (-4.0) (-1.4) (0.8) (5.8) (-0.9) 
MB 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00* 
 (1.0) (-1.0) (3.1) (-2.2) (1.8) 
Sales growth 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00** 
 (2.0) (1.0) (-1.6) (-3.5) (-2.2) 
Ln(Assets) -0.01*** -0.01* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 
 (-3.7) (-1.9) (6.4) (3.1) (2.1) 
Leverage -0.14*** -0.02** -0.08*** 0.25*** -0.01*** 
 (-8.8) (-2.0) (-12.2) (17.3) (-3.1) 
Tangibility -0.03 0.12*** -0.04*** -0.05** -0.00 
 (-1.5) (6.6) (-4.1) (-2.6) (-0.2) 
Observations 11,297 11,297 11,297 11,297 11,297 
R-squared 0.57 0.29 0.56 0.86 0.74 
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Table 4. Financial constraints and the contemporaneous allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
 
Employee stock option data are collected from the IRRC dilution database, Compustat, and Capital IQ. Cash holdings data are obtained from Compustat.  The 
sample covers S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms for the years 1998 to 2013.  ∆Cash is the ratio of change in cash and cash equivalents over book assets.  OP is 
the ratio of option proceeds over book assets.  EIsu-OP is the ratio of non-option proceeds over book assets.  CF is the ratio of operating cash flows over book 
assets.  DIsu is the ratio of debt issues over book assets.  Other is the ratio of other cash flows over book assets.  MB is the ratio of market assets over book 
assets.  Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales.  Ln(Assets) is the log of book assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book assets.  Tangibility is 
the ratio of fixed-assets over book assets.  Each year, a firm is classified as being financially more constrained if its Ln(Assets) is below the 30th percentile, its 
HP index or the WW index is above the 70th percentile, it pays no dividends, or has no credit rating.  A firm is classified as being financially less constrained 
if its Ln(Assets) is above the 70th percentile, its HP index or the WW index is below the 30th percentile, it pays dividends, or has a credit rating.  The 
regressions are estimated separately for more and less financially constrained subsamples. The regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS) with firm 
and year fixed-effects in all the regressions and t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  All control variables are included in the regressions. Only the coefficients on OP are 
reported for brevity.  The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 
    Less financially constrained firms More financially constrained firms 
Constraint  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Measures:   Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div 
Ln(Assets) OP  -0.05   0.38***   0.90***   -0.25**   0.02   0.48***   0.67***   0.05   -0.24***   0.04**  
 
  (-0.3)   (2.7)   (6.9)   (-2.0)   (0.9)   (3.2)   (4.8)   (0.7)   (-2.7)   (2.4)  
EIsu - OP  0.78***   0.06   0.02   0.14   -0.00   0.48***   0.47***   -0.00   0.04   0.00  
   (8.0)   (1.0)   (0.6)   (1.4)   (-0.2)   (11.1)   (13.2)   (-0.2)   (1.6)   (1.4)  
HP Index OP  -0.16   0.51***   0.85***   -0.32**   0.12***   0.43**   0.77***   0.17**   -0.40***   0.04**  
   (-0.7)   (2.6)   (6.4)   (-2.0)   (3.9)   (2.4)   (4.6)   (2.0)   (-4.1)   (2.0)  
 EIsu - OP  0.63***   0.27***   0.01   0.10   -0.01   0.52***   0.44***   -0.01   0.05   0.01  
   (5.5)   (3.1)   (0.2)   (1.1)   (-1.2)   (10.1)   (10.3)   (-0.7)   (1.5)   (1.6)  
WW Index OP  -0.26   0.38**   0.83***   -0.01   0.06   0.61***   0.73***   -0.02   -0.34***   0.01  
   (-1.3)   (2.1)   (6.0)   (-0.0)   (1.6)   (3.4)   (4.4)   (-0.2)   (-3.2)   (1.0)  
 EIsu - OP  0.91***   0.11   -0.04   0.05   -0.02**   0.53***   0.43***   -0.00   0.05   0.00  
   (7.7)   (1.4)   (-0.8)   (0.4)   (-2.1)   (9.6)   (9.8)   (-0.0)   (1.3)   (0.6)  
Dividend Payer OP  -0.23   0.44***   0.70***   0.01   0.09***   0.59***   0.60***   0.20***   -0.41***   0.02**  
43 
 
   (-1.4)   (2.8)   (6.4)   (0.1)   (3.2)   (4.2)   (4.9)   (3.0)   (-4.5)   (2.2)  
 EIsu - OP  0.79***   0.29***   -0.02   -0.07   -0.00   0.54***   0.42***   -0.02*   0.06*   0.00  
   (8.6)   (5.4)   (-0.6)   (-0.8)   (-0.1)   (11.3)   (11.6)   (-1.8)   (1.7)   (1.0)  
Credit Rating OP  -0.02   0.35**   0.81***   -0.16   0.03   0.47***   0.64***   0.16**   -0.32***   0.05***  
   (-0.1)   (2.5)   (7.7)   (-1.3)   (1.1)   (3.5)   (5.2)   (2.4)   (-3.8)   (3.7)  
 EIsu - OP  0.56***   0.30***   -0.01   0.15**   -0.00   0.56***   0.42***   -0.01   0.03   0.00  
   (7.3)   (5.7)   (-0.5)   (2.4)   (-0.3)   (11.2)   (10.7)   (-0.6)   (0.9)   (1.6)  
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Table 5. Financial constraints and the dynamic allocation of equity issuance proceeds 
Employee stock option data are collected from the IRRC dilution database, Compustat, and Capital IQ. Cash holdings data are obtained from Compustat.  The 
sample covers S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms for the years 1998 to 2013.  ∆Cash is the ratio of change in cash and cash equivalents over book assets.  OP is 
the ratio of option proceeds over book assets.  EIsu-OP is the ratio of non-option proceeds over book assets.  CF is the ratio of operating cash flows over book 
assets.  DIsu is the ratio of debt issues over book assets.  Other is the ratio of other cash flows over book assets.  MB is the ratio of market assets over book 
assets.  Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales.  Ln(Assets) is the log of book assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book assets.  Tangibility is 
the ratio of fixed-assets over book assets.  Each year, a firm is classified as being financially more constrained if its Ln(Assets) is below the 30th percentile, its 
HP index or the WW index is above the 70th percentile, it pays no dividends, or has no credit rating.  A firm is classified as being financially less constrained 
if its Ln(Assets) is above the 70th percentile, its HP index or the WW index is below the 30th percentile, it pays dividends, or has a credit rating.  The 
regressions are estimated separately for more and less financially constrained subsamples. The regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS) with firm 
and year fixed-effects in all the regressions and t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  All control variables are included in the regressions. Only the coefficients on OP are 
reported for brevity.  The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Panel A: Dynamic Allocation of Option Proceeds (OP) 
  
Less financially constrained firms More financially constrained firms 
Constraint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Measures:   Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div 
Ln(Assets) OPt  0.23   0.32*   0.70***   -0.28*   0.02   0.63***   0.68***   0.02   -0.37***   0.05**  
 
 
 (1.0)   (1.9)   (4.8)   (-1.8)   (0.5)   (2.9)   (3.4)   (0.2)   (-2.8)   (2.1)  
HP Index OPt  -0.10   0.42*   0.76***   -0.20   0.12***   0.48*   0.89***   0.17   -0.59***   0.05**  
 
 
 (-0.4)   (1.9)   (5.1)   (-1.0)   (3.5)   (2.0)   (3.9)   (1.6)   (-4.4)   (2.2)  
WW Index OPt  -0.09   0.33   0.65***   0.09   0.02   0.80***   0.77***   -0.06   -0.55***   0.03  
 
 
 (-0.4)   (1.6)   (4.2)   (0.6)   (0.6)   (3.4)   (3.5)   (-0.6)   (-3.8)   (1.5)  
Dividend Payer OPt  -0.23   0.40**   0.67***   0.10   0.06**   0.63***   0.79***   0.12   -0.56***   0.02**  
 
 
 (-1.2)   (2.2)   (5.6)   (0.8)   (2.1)   (3.5)   (5.0)   (1.3)   (-4.7)   (2.2)  
Credit Rating OPt  0.18   0.20   0.77***   -0.16   0.02   0.44**   0.84***   0.08   -0.43***   0.07***  
     (0.9)   (1.2)   (6.6)   (-1.0)   (0.9)   (2.5)   (5.4)   (1.0)   (-3.9)   (3.8)  
Ln(Assets) OPt-1  -0.30   -0.06   0.51***   -0.18   0.02   0.14   -0.41**   0.23***   0.06   -0.03  
 
 
 (-1.3)   (-0.3)   (3.6)   (-1.1)   (0.8)   (0.7)   (-2.2)   (2.6)   (0.6)   (-1.2)  
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HP Index OPt-1  -0.16   -0.09   0.65***   -0.40**   -0.00   0.19   -0.43**   0.21**   0.05   -0.01  
 
 
 (-0.6)   (-0.4)   (4.0)   (-2.3)   (-0.1)   (0.9)   (-2.2)   (2.2)   (0.5)   (-0.5)  
WW Index OPt-1  -0.22   0.23   0.30**   -0.32**   0.02   0.27   -0.62***   0.25**   0.11   -0.02  
 
 
 (-1.0)   (1.2)   (2.0)   (-2.4)   (0.6)   (1.2)   (-3.0)   (2.6)   (1.0)   (-0.9)  
Dividend Payer OPt-1  -0.25   0.08   0.42***   -0.23**   -0.01   0.23   -0.46***   0.26***   -0.01   -0.01  
 
 
 (-1.4)   (0.5)   (3.5)   (-2.0)   (-0.4)   (1.4)   (-3.1)   (3.3)   (-0.2)   (-0.8)  
Credit Rating OPt-1  -0.33   -0.12   0.65***   -0.22   0.02   0.28*   -0.40***   0.16**   -0.04   -0.00  
     (-1.4)   (-0.7)   (5.2)   (-1.4)   (0.8)   (1.8)   (-2.8)   (2.2)   (-0.4)   (-0.1)  
Ln(Assets) OPt-2  -0.30   -0.15   0.19   0.25*   0.01   0.15   0.04   0.02   -0.20*   -0.01  
 
 
 (-1.4)   (-1.0)   (1.5)   (1.7)   (0.5)   (0.9)   (0.3)   (0.2)   (-1.9)   (-0.4)  
HP Index OPt-2  -0.06   -0.27   0.17   0.12   0.05   0.16   0.05   -0.07   -0.16*   0.02  
 
 
 (-0.3)   (-1.5)   (1.3)   (0.8)   (1.5)   (0.9)   (0.3)   (-0.8)   (-1.7)   (1.5)  
WW Index OPt-2  -0.05   -0.23   0.07   0.19   0.03   0.16   0.17   -0.10   -0.22**   -0.00  
 
 
 (-0.3)   (-1.2)   (0.5)   (1.2)   (0.8)   (0.9)   (1.0)   (-1.3)   (-2.0)   (-0.4)  
Dividend Payer OPt-2  -0.02   -0.43***   0.30**   0.13   0.02   0.10   0.15   -0.04   -0.22**   0.00  
 
 
 (-0.1)   (-3.1)   (2.5)   (1.0)   (0.6)   (0.7)   (1.2)   (-0.6)   (-2.5)   (0.6)  
Credit Rating OPt-2  0.28   -0.28*   0.05   -0.09   0.04*   0.03   0.10   0.01   -0.16*   0.01  
     (1.6)   (-1.9)   (0.5)   (-0.7)   (1.8)   (0.3)   (0.8)   (0.2)   (-1.9)   (0.8)  
Ln(Assets) OPt-3  -0.14   0.25*   0.14   -0.25   0.00   0.27   -0.09   -0.06   -0.11   -0.00  
 
 
 (-0.7)   (1.7)   (1.1)   (-1.6)   (0.0)   (1.6)   (-0.7)   (-0.9)   (-1.3)   (-0.2)  
HP Index OPt-3  0.13   0.00   0.02   -0.23   0.07***   0.12   0.00   -0.09   -0.04   0.01  
 
 
 (0.5)   (0.0)   (0.2)   (-1.4)   (2.9)   (0.7)   (0.0)   (-1.3)   (-0.5)   (0.4)  
WW Index OPt-3  -0.10   0.11   0.13   -0.10   -0.04   0.33*   -0.10   -0.09   -0.13   -0.01  
 
 
 (-0.5)   (0.6)   (1.0)   (-0.6)   (-1.2)   (1.9)   (-0.7)   (-1.3)   (-1.4)   (-0.4)  
Dividend Payer OPt-3  0.02   0.06   0.05   -0.09   -0.03   0.24*   -0.12   -0.03   -0.09   0.00  
 
 
 (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.5)   (-0.8)   (-1.1)   (1.8)   (-1.0)   (-0.5)   (-1.2)   (0.0)  
Credit Rating OPt-3  0.17   0.01   0.07   -0.29**   0.04**   0.20   -0.09   -0.07   -0.05   0.01  
     (0.9)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (-2.3)   (2.2)   (1.5)   (-0.8)   (-1.1)   (-0.7)   (0.5)  
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Table 5. (Continued) 
Panel B: Dynamic Allocation of Non-Option Proceeds (EIsu-OP) 
  
Less financially constrained firms More financially constrained firms 
Constraint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Measures:   Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div Inv ΔCash ERep DRep Div 
Ln(Assets) (EIsu-OP)t  0.89***   0.13*   -0.04   0.05   -0.03**   0.48***   0.44***   -0.01   0.08*   0.01**  
 
 
 (6.8)   (1.7)   (-1.4)   (0.3)   (-2.5)   (7.1)   (7.2)   (-0.3)   (1.8)   (2.0)  
HP Index (EIsu-OP)t  0.63***   0.35***   -0.05*   0.08   -0.01   0.55***   0.43***   -0.02   0.04   0.00  
 
 
 (5.0)   (3.7)   (-1.8)   (0.9)   (-1.5)   (7.8)   (6.8)   (-1.0)   (1.0)   (0.8)  
WW Index (EIsu-OP)t  1.06***   0.13*   -0.13***   -0.03   -0.04***   0.54***   0.41***   -0.00   0.05   0.00  
 
 
 (7.8)   (1.8)   (-2.9)   (-0.2)   (-3.0)   (7.3)   (6.5)   (-0.2)   (1.1)   (0.2)  
Dividend Payer (EIsu-OP)t  0.91***   0.23***   -0.04   -0.10   -0.01   0.52***   0.44***   -0.02   0.06   0.00  
 
 
 (9.0)   (5.2)   (-1.0)   (-1.0)   (-1.1)   (8.2)   (8.5)   (-1.1)   (1.4)   (0.0)  
Credit Rating (EIsu-OP)t  0.69***   0.32***   -0.04**   0.03   -0.00   0.56***   0.39***   -0.01   0.05   0.00  
     (7.2)   (5.3)   (-2.0)   (0.4)   (-0.4)   (8.4)   (7.3)   (-0.3)   (1.2)   (0.8)  
Ln(Assets) (EIsu-OP)t-1  -0.05   -0.06   -0.01   0.14**   -0.03***   0.09**   -0.05   -0.01*   -0.02   -0.00  
 
 
 (-0.9)   (-1.5)   (-0.4)   (2.2)   (-3.0)   (2.1)   (-1.5)   (-1.8)   (-1.5)   (-0.6)  
HP Index (EIsu-OP)t-1  0.08   -0.09   -0.02*   0.04   -0.01   0.07   -0.03   -0.02*   -0.02   -0.00  
 
 
 (1.0)   (-1.4)   (-1.8)   (0.7)   (-0.9)   (1.6)   (-0.8)   (-1.8)   (-1.2)   (-1.1)  
WW Index (EIsu-OP)t-1  -0.02   -0.04   0.01   0.07   -0.02**   0.07   -0.06   -0.01   -0.01   0.00  
 
 
 (-0.2)   (-1.1)   (0.3)   (0.9)   (-2.5)   (1.4)   (-1.3)   (-0.5)   (-0.5)   (0.3)  
Dividend Payer (EIsu-OP)t-1  0.07   0.02   0.01   -0.09**   -0.02***   0.09**   -0.05   -0.02*   -0.02   -0.00  
 
 
 (1.6)   (0.8)   (0.7)   (-2.1)   (-2.9)   (2.2)   (-1.6)   (-1.9)   (-1.0)   (-0.4)  
Credit Rating (EIsu-OP)t-1  0.12**   -0.10***   -0.04***   0.03   -0.01***   0.08**   -0.03   -0.02*   -0.03*   -0.00  
     (2.3)   (-2.6)   (-3.3)   (0.8)   (-2.8)   (2.0)   (-1.0)   (-1.8)   (-1.9)   (-0.8)  
Ln(Assets) (EIsu-OP)t-2  -0.01   0.01   -0.04*   0.05   -0.01*   0.01   0.00   -0.01***   0.00   0.00  
 
 
 (-0.3)   (0.6)   (-1.8)   (1.4)   (-1.9)   (0.3)   (0.1)   (-2.6)   (0.4)   (0.7)  
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HP Index (EIsu-OP)t-2  -0.05   0.02   0.01   0.02   -0.00   0.02   -0.00   -0.02***   0.00   0.00  
 
 
 (-0.6)   (0.6)   (0.8)   (0.3)   (-1.2)   (1.2)   (-0.3)   (-3.7)   (0.4)   (0.4)  
WW Index (EIsu-OP)t-2  -0.00   -0.02   -0.02   0.05   -0.01*   0.01   -0.01   -0.01   0.01   0.00  
 
 
 (-0.0)   (-1.2)   (-0.8)   (1.2)   (-1.9)   (0.4)   (-0.5)   (-1.6)   (0.7)   (0.3)  
Dividend Payer (EIsu-OP)t-2  0.02   0.02   -0.01   -0.03   -0.01   0.02   -0.00   -0.01***   -0.00   0.00  
 
 
 (0.4)   (0.7)   (-0.3)   (-1.1)   (-1.0)   (1.2)   (-0.1)   (-3.0)   (-0.4)   (0.5)  
Credit Rating (EIsu-OP)t-2  0.05   -0.01   -0.04***   0.01   -0.01**   0.02   -0.00   -0.02***   -0.01   0.00  
     (1.6)   (-0.6)   (-3.5)   (0.2)   (-2.1)   (1.3)   (-0.1)   (-3.2)   (-0.5)   (1.4)  
Ln(Assets) (EIsu-OP)t-3  -0.05   0.04**   -0.03   0.04   -0.00   0.03*   -0.03*   -0.01**   0.01   0.00  
 
 
 (-1.4)   (2.1)   (-1.4)   (1.4)   (-1.1)   (1.7)   (-1.7)   (-2.4)   (0.6)   (0.3)  
HP Index (EIsu-OP)t-3  -0.04   0.10**   -0.03*   -0.02   -0.01   0.03*   -0.02   -0.01**   -0.00   -0.00  
 
 
 (-0.7)   (2.2)   (-1.7)   (-0.4)   (-1.5)   (1.9)   (-1.2)   (-2.5)   (-0.3)   (-0.3)  
WW Index (EIsu-OP)t-3  -0.01   0.01   -0.02   0.03   -0.01   0.03**   -0.02*   -0.01***   0.00   -0.00  
 
 
 (-0.4)   (0.7)   (-0.7)   (0.7)   (-1.0)   (2.0)   (-1.7)   (-2.6)   (0.1)   (-0.7)  
Dividend Payer (EIsu-OP)t-3  0.01   0.01   0.01   -0.04   0.00   0.02   -0.01   -0.01**   -0.00   -0.00  
 
 
 (0.3)   (0.3)   (0.2)   (-1.1)   (0.7)   (1.5)   (-1.0)   (-2.2)   (-0.2)   (-0.9)  
Credit Rating (EIsu-OP)t-3  -0.03   0.04   -0.02***   0.01   -0.00   0.03**   -0.02   -0.01**   -0.01   0.00  
     (-1.0)   (1.6)   (-3.2)   (0.6)   (-0.2)   (2.3)   (-1.6)   (-2.0)   (-0.7)   (0.3)  
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Table 6. Analysis of equity issues 
Employee stock option data are collected from the IRRC dilution database, Compustat, and Capital IQ. Cash holdings data are obtained from Compustat.  The 
sample covers S&P 1500 and Nasdaq 100 firms for the years 1998 to 2013.  ISSUE% is defined as the ratio of common equity proceeds to end of period 
market equity.  Employee-related equity issues refer to equity issued to employees due to the exercises of employee stock options.  Non-employee-related 
equity issues relate to the difference between total equity issues and equity issued as a result of employee stock option exercises.  Investor-initiated issues are 
equity issues with ISSUE% less than 2%, whereas firm-initiated issues are equity issues with ISSUE% greater than 3%.  
 
Panel A: Employee- versus Non-Employee-Related Equity Issues 
    Number of employee-related equity issues   Amount of employee-related equity issues (in $ billions) 
  
                  
Cut-off Points   < a between a and b > b Total   < a between a and b > b Total 
a = 2%, b = 3%   15,265 550 338 16,153   548 68 26 642 
a = 2%, b = 5%   15,265 778 110 16,153   548 89 5 642 
a = 3%, b = 4%   15,815 177 161 16,153   616 17 9 642 
a = 4%, b = 6%   15,992 83 78 16,153   633 6 3 642 
a = 5%, b = 6%   16,043 32 78 16,153   637 2 3 642 
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Table 6. (Continued)  
  
Number of non-employee-related equity issues   Amount of non-employee-related equity issues (in $ billions) 
                      
Cut-off Points   < a between a and b > b Total   < a between a and b > b Total 
a = 2%, b = 3%   9,967 124 944 11,035   137 11 273 421 
a = 2%, b = 5%   9,967 238 830 11,035   137 33 251 421 
a = 3%, b = 4%   10,091 65 879 11,035   148 12 261 421 
a = 4%, b = 6%   10,156 111 768 11,035   160 24 237 421 
a = 5%, b = 6%   10,205 62 768 11,035   170 15 237 421 
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Table 6. (Continued) 
Panel B: Actual Sample Data and the Identification Rule of McKeon (2013) 
 
      Based on Actual Sample Data   Based on the 2-3% ISSUE rule of McKeon (2013) 
                                          
Year   
Total no. of 
equity issues 
  
Firms that issue 
employee- and 
non-employee 
related equity 
  
Firms that issue 
employee-related 
equity only 
  
Firms that issue 
non-employee 
related equity 
only   
Firms that issue 
investor-initiated 
equity only 
  
Firms that issue 
firm-initiated 
equity only 
  
Firms that are 
disregarded 
    #   # %   # %   # %   # %   # %   # % 
1998   692   465 67%   201 29%   26 4%   607 88%   52 8%   33 5% 
1999   747   529 71%   194 26%   24 3%   638 85%   72 10%   37 5% 
2000   825   547 66%   228 28%   50 6%   679 82%   102 12%   44 5% 
2001   872   611 70%   230 26%   31 4%   725 83%   104 12%   43 5% 
2002   915   623 68%   265 29%   27 3%   765 84%   98 11%   52 6% 
2003   936   644 69%   280 30%   12 1%   805 86%   90 10%   41 4% 
2004   1,254   858 68%   387 31%   9 1%   1,036 83%   133 11%   85 7% 
2005   1,319   890 67%   422 32%   7 1%   1,123 85%   96 7%   100 8% 
2006   1,300   871 67%   421 32%   8 1%   1,099 85%   111 9%   90 7% 
2007   1,265   818 65%   436 34%   11 1%   1,082 86%   93 7%   90 7% 
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2008   1,186   752 63%   399 34%   35 3%   1,037 87%   97 8%   52 4% 
2009   1,103   661 60%   381 35%   61 6%   967 88%   113 10%   23 2% 
2010   1,110   640 58%   443 40%   27 2%   1,001 90%   71 6%   38 3% 
2011   1,068   627 59%   420 39%   21 2%   959 90%   64 6%   45 4% 
2012   1,025   565 55%   426 42%   34 3%   950 93%   37 4%   38 4% 
2013   939   531 57%   388 41%   20 2%   851 91%   50 5%   38 4% 
Total   16,556   10,632     5,521     403     14,324     1,383     849   
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Appendix A. Variables defined using the flow-of-funds data 
 
Variables are defined using flow-of-funds data of Compustat.  The variable definitions vary according to the format code (scf) a firm follows in reporting 
flow-of-funds data. Effective for fiscal years ending July 15, 1988, SFAS #95 requires U.S. companies to report the Statement of Cash Flows (scf  = 7).   Prior 
to adoption of SFAS #95, companies may have reported one of the following statements: Working Capital Statement (scf  = 1), Cash Statement by Source and 
Use of Funds (scf = 2), and Cash Statement by Activity (scf = 3).  Variables include the change in cash holdings (∆Cash), investment (Inv), the change in 
working capital (∆WC), cash dividends (Div), cash flows (CF), net debt issued (∆D), and net equity issued (∆E).  PPE denotes property, plant, and equipment. 
We include in parentheses the Compustat XPF variable names in italics.   
 
 
Variables scf = 1 scf = 2 scf = 3 scf = 7 
Inv capital expenditure(capx) + increase in 
investment(ivch) + acquisition(aqc) + other uses of 
funds(fuseo) - sale of PPE(sppe) - sale of 
investment(siv)  
same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 capital expenditure (capx) + increase in 
investment(ivch) + acquisition(aqc) - sale of 
PPE(sppe) - sale of investment(siv) - change in short-
term investment(ivstch) - other investing 
activities(ivaco) 
     
∆Cash cash and cash equivalents increase/decrease (chech) same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 
     
Div cash dividends (dv) same as scf = 1 same as scf =1 same as scf = 1 
     
DIsu long-term debt issuance(dltis) - changes in current 
debt(dlcch) 
long-term debt issuance(dltis) + 
changes in current debt(dlcch) 
same as scf = 2 same as scf = 2 
DRep long-term debt reduction(dltr) long-term debt reduction(dltr) same as scf = 2 same as scf = 2 
     
EIsu sale of common and preferred stock (sstk)  same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 
ERep purchase of common and preferred stock(prstkc) same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 
     
∆WC change in working capital(wcapc) - change in working 
capital(wcapc) 
same as scf = 2 -change in account receivable(recch) - change in 
inventory(invch) - change in account payable(apalch) 
- accrued income taxes(txach) - other changes in 
assets and liabilities (aoloch) - other financing 
activities(fiao) 
     
CF income before extra items(ibc) + extra items & 
discontinued operation(xidoc) + depreciation & 
amortization(dpc) + deferred taxes(txdc) + equity in 
net loss(esubc) + gains in sale of PPE & 
investment(sppiv) + other funds from 
operation(fopo) + other sources of funds(fsrco)  
same as scf = 1 same as scf = 1 income before extra items(ibc) + extra items & 
discontinued operation(xidoc) + depreciation & 
amortization(dpc) + deferred taxes(txdc) + equity in 
net loss(esubc) + gains in sale of PPE & 
investment(sppiv) + other funds from operation(fopo) 
+ exchange rate effect(exre)  
 
